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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OSLO 000220

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SCA/A TOM REOTT, EUR/RPM AARON COPE

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [NATO](#) [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [AF](#) [NO](#)

SUBJECT: NORWAY SUPPORTIVE OF AFGHAN POLICY IN PRINCIPLE,
LESS SO IN ACTIONS

REF: A. A: STATE 29482

[1](#)B. B: STATE 31102

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin M. Johnson
for reasons 1.4 b and d

[1](#)1. (C) SUMMARY: Norway's special envoy for Afghanistan, Janis Kanavin, welcomed the conclusions of the U.S. Afghanistan Pakistan Strategic Review and stated that Norway was in broad agreement with the U.S. approach, particularly the need for increased civilian assistance and the implementation of the regional approach. The GON is currently considering what contributions they will announce at the NATO Summit and will not make the final decision until shortly before the Summit begins. However, it appears that the GON is unable or unwilling to meet the majority of the specific requests listed in ref tel B. Funding for the ANA Trust Fund, LOTFA and ARTF appears to be the most promising area for Norway to contribute. END SUMMARY

GON Likes the Ideas....

[1](#)2. (C) The concepts of intensifying civilian efforts to build capacities in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the linking of Pakistan and Afghanistan are music to the Norwegian MFA's ears. The MFA itself created a joint Afghanistan/Pakistan section in the fall of 2008 and has long preached the need for increases in civilian aid and support for the UN. The GON has committed itself to significant military and civilian contributions in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, with a relative parity in money spent on military and civilian assistance. In many ways the GON views the "comprehensive approach" as their own creation, and is committed to supporting Kai Eide's efforts to strengthen the civilian and UN aspects of the international effort in Afghanistan as well as continuing their military contribution.

...but Contributions are Limited

[1](#)3. (C) Despite their strong support for the conclusions of the U.S. Strategic Review, the GON will likely not announce any substantial increase in their contributions at the NATO Summit. Specifics on the GON decisions were not yet available, as the GON political leadership will not decide until right before the Summit. However, reviewing the list of Norway specific requests in ref tel B with the MFA and Ministry of Defense revealed the limitations (real and self-imposed) that the GON has in responding.

[1](#)4. (C) On the military side, Norway has an OMLT team deployed in Afghanistan that is committed until October 2010. They do not have the staffing resources to consider another Norwegian

OMLT but are considering a Nordic OMLT. Discussions on the latter are only at the initial stage. Norwegian Special Forces are currently training elements of the Afghan police and the MOD would like to continue this training. Norway's one new C-130J (delivered to the Norwegian Air Force in the fall of 2008) is currently unavailable for deployment due to damage suffered in a training exercise. It is expected that Norway will take delivery of additional aircraft in early summer 2009 and again in the summer of 2010 and begin training. After that, this request might become viable.

¶5. (C) On the civilian side the GON is actively considering contributions to the ANA Trust Fund, the LOTFA and the ARTF. The GON already contributes approximately 17 million dollars to the ARTF and has donated to the LOTFA last year. Police mentoring teams are also being considered, as is the NTM-A proposal. The GON hesitation on NTM-A arises from concern that development of the Afghan police be balanced with military and civilian aspects. The MFA was intrigued by the request for customs infrastructure at borders and promised to consider it.

¶6. (C) Other items are more problematic. The request for increases in PRT's support for governance and development is directly counter to the GON's strongly held policy of separating all civilian and military activities and would not be acceptable to the GON. Similarly, the requests for technical experts in natural gas development and for contributions to power projects run counter to the GON's existing civilian aid priorities, which are good governance, education and rural development. The GON did not reject the

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request but stated that given the large amounts necessary for infrastructure projects they preferred to use their money on smaller projects.

Comment

¶7. (C) Although the GON may not be able or willing to contribute at present with much more than money, it is quite useful to pressure them to consider the list of requests, particularly an additional OMLT, military police training, and civilian and technical experts in natural gas and power projects. The capability is there for these items, but it will require political will to alter existing priorities. Sustained pressure from the Government of Afghanistan, NATO and the U.S. has been effective in the past in pushing a reluctant GON to change policy priorities.

WHITNEY